

# LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

## Testimony on Sentencing Reform

### California State Capitol

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As prosecutors, our job is to seek justice, not simply garner convictions; justice for both the accused and justice for victims of crime.

This responsibility entrusts prosecutors with extraordinary authority to affect life and liberty and the solemn duty to exercise great care and discretion. From our decision to file a case to our determination to argue for a specified sentence, our actions impact not only the individuals directly involved in any given case, but the community as a whole. Each criminal we remove from the street makes our citizens safer and when we fail, that safety suffers.

The harmony necessary to our pursuit of justice is challenged by limited resources. Where is our time and money best allocated? What expenditures maximize public safety?

If we limit our analysis to institutional costs alone, then it is clearly less expensive to monitor an offender on probation than send him to prison. Housing expenses for long prison terms exceed the same expenses associated with shorter terms.

But housing costs are only one portion of the complicated calculus we must consider.

The costs of crime cannot be easily quantified. It is impossible to place a monetary value on the life of a loved one, or on the moral devastation of a sexual assault, or the insecurity experienced by a homeowner after a break in. There are certain measurable costs associated with these crimes. Health care costs, insurance premiums, taxes to fund public services such as police and coroners, all rise as crime takes its toll on society. Individuals bear the expense of funerals, lost wages, relocation, and counseling.

Crime may not pay, but its full direct and indirect cost to society is immeasurable. For these reasons, I am strongly opposed to the idea that sentencing decisions should be made on a purely financial basis. This fundamentally flawed policy will never enhance public safety and, if implemented, would lead to incongruous results. Consider two crimes: embezzlement and child molestation. The costs of the first crime, embezzlement, are rather simple to sum. How much was taken? How much spent on apprehension of the perpetrator? How much interest was lost? This simple equation is not possible with the second crime. If our sentencing decision was based only on a costs analysis, we might punish the thief more harshly than the molester. After all, to thieves in the aggregate, we can attribute billions of dollars of loss, but for the child molester placing a value on the harm caused to an innocent child and the broken life that so often follows this crime is all but impossible.

There are, of course, some systematic costs that can be compared among differing crimes. The cost of housing an inmate in prison is one of them. It is not cheap. Current Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) estimates inform us it costs \$34,150 per year to house one inmate.<sup>1</sup> Parole supervision is a bargain by comparison: \$4,067 per year per parolee.

However, limiting the analysis to institutional costs is misleading because recidivism rates are soaring. CDCR tracked all felons released to parole for the first time in 2002. In just three years, 57.24 percent had been returned to prison.<sup>2</sup> Almost 72 percent of felons released following terms for vehicle theft were returned to prison in the same period. In 2005 alone, 80,935 parolees were returned to prison, a number representing over 61 percent of the average daily parolee population<sup>3</sup> and more than half of CDCR's total inmate population.<sup>4</sup>

These distressing figures suggest that “life on the installment plan” sentencing is not just a catchy phrase – it is a reality, and an expensive one at that.

Consider an inmate destined to spend a decade in prison. He can spend ten consecutive years, or serve the term in slices. Assuming constant pricing, ten consecutive years of incarceration will cost taxpayers \$341,500. Ten intermittent years of custody exact the same toll. The difference is each separate installment bears additional costs associated with police and prosecutor time devoted to investigating a new case or violation and court time devoted to processing and perhaps trying the new case. Additional costs may lie with local custodial facilities charged with housing the inmate while the new case is pending as well as CDCR

costs associated with intake procedures each time the inmate is re-admitted. There are also costs associated with parole supervision while the inmate is out of custody, and, of course, the unquantifiable cost of the new crimes committed. It is thus easy to see that a decade on the installment plan is far more costly to taxpayers than a 10-year sentence.

State policy must address recidivism in a comprehensive and thoughtful way that places a priority on public safety. Parolees are ill equipped for productive lives in society. We must provide and mandate vocational and other programs for parolees just as we require probationers to attend counseling or drug treatment programs.

To embrace the promise of rehabilitation, however, these services must begin in the prison. Such measures cannot wait until an inmate is paroled. Once “outside” the inmate’s incentive to participate in educational and vocational programs is severely diminished while the risk to the community is heightened. This is unacceptable.

The California District Attorneys Association fully supports efforts to increase educational and rehabilitative opportunities for inmates and parolees to increase their chances of success. But for these opportunities to be fulfilled, there must be real incentives.

Current law allows for a reduction in time served in custody for performance in work, training, and education programs to encourage prisoners’ participation. Nevertheless, there is no requirement that prisoners actually complete programs in order to receive custody credits. There are no institutional incentives. Is it realistic to rely on inmates’ desires for self-actualization as the sole motivation for their participation in rehabilitative programs?

In 2004, Senator Poochigian authored SB 1660, which would have required inmates who failed to complete educational or vocational programs to forfeit all participation credits previously awarded for the incomplete program. The bill failed.<sup>5</sup> Senator Poochigian introduced similar legislation, SB 1635, in February of this year. Though the credit provisions were gutted, the remaining legislation will require CDCR to evaluate each inmate and provide specific programs.<sup>6</sup> While this is an excellent start, and CDAA supports the bill, the absence of credit-based incentives creates concern for the success of new program.

This Commission should continue to work with the legislature to create workable incentives for inmate participation in remedial programs. We suggest requiring

inmate *participation* – as opposed to simple *enrollment* – in such programs as a prerequisite for custody credits. Supplemental reduction credits should not be offered unless such programs can be linked directly to reductions in recidivism rates.

If the success of rehabilitative programs in prisons is increased, recidivism rates will fall. Though the initial costs of longer prison stays may seem daunting, the long-term benefits promise less costly prisons and safer streets for all Californians.

Now, however, is not the time to modify California sentencing laws – such changes are unnecessary and unjustified. The current sentencing structure in California, a combined determinate and indeterminate sentencing scheme, in my view represents good public policy. This scheme recognizes that justice is better “served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with the provision for uniformity in the sentencing of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances.”<sup>7</sup> Uniformity allows for similar treatment for similar crimes, which provides for fairness and certainty in the judicial system.

The current model is working. It has been successful in holding individuals who commit serious and heinous crimes responsible for their actions. It acts as a deterrent and keeps crime rates down by keeping dangerous offenders off the streets. Before adoption of our current model, the judicial system acted as a revolving door for criminals. For example, defendant Kenneth Parnell was first convicted in 1951 for sexually abusing an eight-year-old boy he had kidnapped. After serving his prison sentence, he kidnapped seven-year-old Steven Stayner in 1972, held him for seven years, and then kidnapped five-year-old Timmy White in 1980 before getting caught. After serving five of an eight-year prison sentence—the maximum sentence available at the time—Parnell was released. He was then caught and convicted again in 2004 for trying to purchase another child.<sup>8</sup> If existing sentencing laws had been in place at the time of his original convictions, Parnell would have received multiple-life sentences and wouldn’t have had the opportunity to reoffend.<sup>9</sup>

Another example is defendant Larry Singleton who was convicted of brutally raping and mutilating a victim leaving her for dead. After being sentenced to 14 years and four months, and serving just over seven, he traveled to Florida State, where he found and murdered his next victim.<sup>10</sup> Again, if California’s existing laws had been in place at the time, Singleton too would have received multiple life-sentences,<sup>11</sup> and one more life would have been spared.

In Ventura County, we recently prosecuted Douglas Dworak for the rape and murder of 18-year-old Crystal Hamilton. This tragic crime occurred in 2001 – just 19 months after Dworak completed parole for another rape he committed in 1986. In this earlier crime, he followed the victim home from the grocery store, ensuring that no one was about before attacking her in her own driveway. Though he cut the victim severely during the attack, he was sentenced to only 18 years – of which he served fewer than nine and a half years. Current law would have allowed prosecutors to ensure Dworak never raped again,<sup>12</sup> and Crystal would be alive today.

In each of the above examples, the defendants' sentences, under current law, would be enhanced due to Penal Code section 667.61, commonly referred to as "One Strike." That section applies specifically to sexual offenses, but California possesses an equally powerful tool for dealing with other types of dangerous criminals.

Three Strikes, though frequently criticized in the media, is as powerful and effective a tool for keeping Californians safe as any tool prosecutors possess. I urge this Commission not to recommend any changes weakening this law.

By way of background, as executive director of the California District Attorneys Association in 1994, it was my responsibility to promote a more narrowly drawn, competing legislative proposal authored by Assembly Member Richard Rainey. Prosecutors at that time feared the ballot initiative did not provide sufficient sentencing discretion. These fears were shortly assuaged by the California Supreme Court's *Romero* decision. By granting trial judges the ability to reduce Three Strikes sentences in appropriate cases, the court broadened our discretion allowing us to fashion sentences appropriate to the crimes and the offenders.

In 1994, we also worried about costs. Opponents of Three Strikes predicted skyrocketing costs associated with massive prison construction necessary to house third-strike defendants. Some even predicted the law would bankrupt the state.

None of these dire predictions have borne fruit. As of December 2005, less than five percent of CDCR inmates are serving life sentences pursuant to Three Strikes,<sup>13</sup> and we are sending fewer three-strike defendants to prison every year.<sup>14</sup> Further, while Three Strikes undoubtedly has led to longer sentences for many recidivist criminals, it has not led to rampant overcrowding in prisons. In fact, the percent of the general California population incarcerated in CDCR has fallen every year since 1998.<sup>15</sup> Since Three Strikes inception, six new prisons have opened in

California and one has closed; five of the six new prisons were authorized and funded before Three Strikes was enacted.<sup>16</sup>

In terms of crime reduction, Three Strikes has been wildly effective. Compared to 1993, the 2004 California crime rate was down over 40 percent. Violent crime has plummeted in the same time period and is now almost half of what it was in 1994.<sup>17</sup> Californians haven't been this safe since 1972.<sup>18</sup>

Three Strikes works just as it should. By locking up the worst offenders we reduced the crime rate. Those who spent their lifetime committing crime were incapacitated by incarceration. Thousands of violent career thugs will never again terrorize our communities. Prisons were not overrun because these criminals were already occupying the space – in shifts. Take the case of Ventura County's Albert Cruz who received a life sentence under Three Strikes in 1997. In affirming his sentence, the Court of Appeal noted he had rarely spent time outside state or local supervision. This is but one example of "life on the installment plan."<sup>19</sup>

By incapacitating career recidivists and jamming the revolving door, Three Strikes has made all Californians safer – especially from violent crime.

Property crime, though still reduced when compared to 1993, is once again on the rise.<sup>20</sup> Of the many factors likely responsible for this trend, one is the tightening of resources for prosecutors and police. In my office alone we have experienced a 15 percent reduction in attorney staff and a 17 percent reduction in investigator staff over the last five years.

With fewer resources, fewer thieves are caught. Fewer prosecutors available to try cases means more non-violent cases are resolved by plea bargain, resulting in shorter sentences. Thieves are out of custody sooner and thus permitted to steal again. Of recidivists, burglars and felony thieves are among the most prolific, with almost 72 percent of auto thieves, more than 60 percent of burglars, and close to 65 percent of other felony theft offenders being returned to prison within three years of release on parole.<sup>21</sup> In Ventura County, budget cuts have forced 3,400 early inmate releases from county jail since 2003. These offenders often return immediately back into the system.

Identity theft is another contributing factor. In Ventura County alone, more than 700 cases of identity theft have been reported each year since 2003. This figure accounts for four percent of Ventura County's property crimes as indexed by the FBI.

Identity theft is the perfect storm. Once thought reserved only for computer hacks, now drug addicts, common thieves, and even gang members are committing identity theft. It is quick, easy, profitable, and difficult to track. Law enforcement has dramatically improved its ability to investigate this crime, but our laws lag behind. A victim's life savings can be washed away at the push of a button, but the offender, if caught, is typically limited to no more than three years in custody.<sup>22</sup> When compared to the potential profits, the criminal's equation is simple – for this offense – at this point in our history, crime may very well pay – and pay very well.

Unquestionably, another contributing factor is the passage of Proposition 36 in 2000, coincidentally, the first year in which property crime rates began to increase.<sup>23</sup> Proposition 36, was intended to help individuals break the cycle of addiction. It permitted people convicted of first and second non-violent drug possession offenses to choose treatment over incarceration. The scheme specifically excluded in-custody drug treatment, and forbid incarceration as a means of addressing violations.

Proposition 36 has failed. UCLA reports that Proposition 36 resulted in a net savings when comparing incarceration costs to treatment costs. But the study does not appear to have taken into account the costs of additional crimes - mostly property crimes and other drug crimes - committed by defendants who manipulated the system.<sup>24</sup>

Fewer than 25 percent of persons sent to Proposition 36 actually complete treatment,<sup>25</sup> and, based on our experience in Ventura County, even some “graduates” have reoffended. Even more alarming, the initiative was only funded through June 2006, and even though the funding ends, the treatment requirements continue. Without funding, it is unclear how these services can be provided. Without treatment, Proposition 36 is nothing more than a covert legalization of drug usage.

CDAA is currently sponsoring legislation to fund and repair Proposition 36. SB 803<sup>26</sup> is the result of over a year's worth of negotiation among a broad-based coalition representing the courts, law enforcement, probation, prosecutors, public defenders, treatment providers, and counties. Its provisions are true not only to the original intent of Proposition 36, but also to more traditional tenets of criminal consequences. For every carrot, there must be a stick, and so SB 803 authorizes incarceration of up to 30 days for nondrug-related violations of probation, and up to 10 days of a custodial detoxification program for violations involving drug use.

SB 803 further incorporates the successful drug court model into Proposition 36, providing court monitoring of probationers via a dedicated calendar, close collaboration with treatment providers and probation, drug testing commensurate with treatment needs, and supervision of progress through review hearings.

I urge this Commission to lend its support to the passage of SB 803.<sup>27</sup>

The problem of sex offenders represents another broad area that begs for improvement. In recent years, there have been numerous legislative efforts to improve both the penalty and treatment provisions geared towards these offenders. But the piecemeal approach typical of the legislative process has left gaps and inconsistencies that frustrate our attempts to apply the law evenhandedly.

Jessica's Law goes before the voters in November.<sup>28</sup> This ballot initiative takes a different approach. It proposes comprehensive legislation that provides uniformity and predictability in sex-offender sentencing. Jessica's Law will enable prosecutors to remove the most dangerous of sexual predators from our communities without the requirement of a second victim. Offenders who are amenable to treatment and rehabilitation will be released, safely, into our communities. To increase public safety upon release of these offenders, Jessica's Law tolls the inmates' parole period until the day they are released from custody or a treatment facility. This tolling permits state authorities to closely monitor these offenders while they reincorporate into society. Their safe release will be enhanced by the use of global positioning monitoring for the life of the offender.

Jessica's Law is supported by a long list of law enforcement agencies, victims' rights groups, and government entities. I urge this Commission to join them and CDAA in support of Jessica's Law.<sup>29</sup>

The devastation caused by crime is enormous.

I have sat with grieving family members in my office, trying to explain how the justice system might provide some closure. I have watched victims in court react to guilty verdicts and death sentences. I have learned closure is often a hollow goal.

My job is to do justice for the victims and the offenders. For both, justice demands fair, predictable, and appropriate sentencing, increased efforts at rehabilitation, and constant vigilance. Justice demands more than closure, justice demands prevention.

Our history has proven we can prevent crime through sentencing. By incapacitating thousands of our most dangerous offenders, we have cut our violent crime rate almost in half.

There is much more to be done. We must focus on rehabilitative efforts for those offenders who will reenter society so that they will have true options for leading an honest life.

It has been my privilege to serve the cause of justice for many years now. I hope my comments here will serve to advance that cause even farther.

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<sup>1</sup> California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Divisions and Boards, Adult Operations and Adult Programs, Facts and Figures, [hereinafter CDCR Facts and Figures] First Quarter 2006; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/AOAP/FactsFigures.html> (accessed June 15, 2006.)

<sup>2</sup> California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Reports and Research, Offender Information Reports [hereinafter CDCR Offender Information], Recidivism Rate, Three year follow-up period, *Recidivism Rates within One, Two and Three Year Follow-up Periods for All Felons Paroled to California Supervision California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Released from Prison for First Time in 2002 By Principal Commitment Offense*; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Annual/RECID3/Recid3d2002.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)

<sup>3</sup> CDCR Offender Information, Parolees Returned Annual, *Rate Of Felon Parolees Returned To California Prisons-Calendar Year 2005*, Table 1, Total Felon Parolees Returned to California Prisons Number and Rate per 100 Average Daily Population (ADP) Calendar Year 1975-2005; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Annual/PVRET2/PVRET2d2005.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)

<sup>4</sup> CDCR, Facts and Figures, Fourth Quarter 2005; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/AOAP/FactFiguresArchive/FactsFigures4thQ2005.html> (accessed June 15, 2006.) CDCR's prison population at the end of 2005 was 158,176.

<sup>5</sup> California State Senate, Legislation, SB 1660; <http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery> (accessed June 15, 2006.) The Little Hoover Commission is listed as support for the bill in the Senate Floor Analysis of May, 24, 2004. [http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb\\_1651-1700/sb\\_1660\\_cfa\\_20040524\\_180209\\_sen\\_floor.html](http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1651-1700/sb_1660_cfa_20040524_180209_sen_floor.html) (accessed June 15, 2006.)

<sup>6</sup> California State Senate, Legislation, SB 1635; <http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery> (accessed June 15, 2006.)

<sup>7</sup> Penal Code Section 1170(a)

<sup>8</sup> CDAA, Prosecutors' Perspective on California's Three Strikes Law – A 10-Year Retrospective (2004) pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> See Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (a). Lewd or lascivious acts (Pen. Code § 288, subd. (a)) committed against a child who has been kidnapped for that purpose is now punishable by a term of 25 years to life in prison.

<sup>10</sup> David W. Paulson, President of CDAA, Presentation to the CPR Commission Public Hearing, Corrections Reform and Public Safety, California State Long Beach, Sept. 10, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> See Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (a). Rape (Pen. Code § 261) accompanied by aggravated mayhem or torture (Pen. Code §§ 205, 206) is now punishable by a term of 25 years to life in prison.

<sup>12</sup> See Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (a). Rape (Pen. Code § 261) accompanied by great bodily injury (Pen. Code § 12022.7) and the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (Pen. Code § 12022) is now punishable by a term of 25 years to life in prison.

<sup>13</sup> CDCR Offender Information, Characteristics, Second and Third Strike Inmate Population, Quarterly, Table 1 Second And Third Strikers In The Adult Institution Population By Offense Category, Offense Group, And Type Of Conviction As Of December 31, 2005; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d0512.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.) Also, CDCR, Facts and Figures, Fourth Quarter 2005; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/AOAP/FactFiguresArchive/FactsFigures4thQ2005.html> (accessed June 15, 2006.)

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- <sup>14</sup> CDAA, Prosecutors' Perspective on California's Three Strikes Law – A 10-Year Retrospective (2004) p. 28, Chart 5. Since 2003 only 481 new three strike inmates have been admitted to CDCR, for a two year average of only 240 per year. See CDCR Offender Information, Characteristics, Second and Third Strike Inmate Population, Quarterly, Table 1 Second And Third Strikers In The Adult Institution Population By Offense Category, Offense Group, And Type Of Conviction As Of December 31, 2005; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d0512.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>15</sup> CDAA, Prosecutors' Perspective on California's Three Strikes Law – A 10-Year Retrospective (2004) pp. 25-26, Chart 4. See also, CDCR Offender Information, Historical Trends (Annual), *Historical Trends 1984-2004*; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Annual/HIST2/HIST2d2004.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006) and California Department of Finance, Demographic Information, E-7. California Population Estimates, with Components of Change and Crude Rates, July 1, 1900-2005; [http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/Estimates/E-7/E-7\\_1900-Jul05.xls](http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/Estimates/E-7/E-7_1900-Jul05.xls) (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>16</sup> CDAA, Prosecutors' Perspective on California's Three Strikes Law – A 10-Year Retrospective (2004) pp. 28-29, Chart 6.
- <sup>17</sup> CJSC, Publications, *Crime in California 2004*, Table 1, CRIMES, 1952-2004, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population; <http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd04/Data%20Tables.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> For more examples go to [www.keep3strikes.org](http://www.keep3strikes.org).
- <sup>20</sup> CJSC, Publications, *Crime in California 2004*, Table 1, CRIMES, 1952-2004, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population; <http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd04/Data%20Tables.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>21</sup> CDCR Offender Information, Recidivism Rate, Three year follow-up period, *Recidivism Rates within One, Two and Three Year Follow-up Periods for All Felons Paroled to California Supervision California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Released from Prison for First Time in 2002 By Principal Commitment Offense*; <http://www.corr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Annual/RECID3/Recid3d2002.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>22</sup> See e.g. Penal Code section 530.5, unauthorized use of identifying information, is punishable as an alternate felony or misdemeanor (a wobbler). If felony punishment is selected, the sentencing triad is 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years in prison, with 2 years being the presumptive term. (Pen. Code § 18 and § 1170, subd. (a)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.420.) Grand theft is also a wobbler, unless a firearm is used in which case it is a straight felony. Either way the prison triad is the same, 16 – 2 – 3. (Pen. Code § 489.)
- <sup>23</sup> CJSC, Publications, *Crime in California 2004*, Table 1, CRIMES, 1952-2004, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population; <http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd04/Data%20Tables.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>24</sup> Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Bill Analysis, SB 803, Hearing Date, June 13, 2006: [http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb\\_0801-0850/sb\\_803\\_cfa\\_20060612\\_100435\\_asm\\_comm.html](http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_803_cfa_20060612_100435_asm_comm.html) (accessed June 15, 2006.)
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> SB 803, Amended June 8, 2006; [http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb08010850/sb\\_803\\_bill\\_20060608\\_amended\\_asm.pdf](http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb08010850/sb_803_bill_20060608_amended_asm.pdf) (accessed June 16, 2006.)
- <sup>27</sup> Please see the attached letter of support from David LaBahn, Executive Director, CDAA.
- <sup>28</sup> California Office of the Attorney General, Initiative Measures, Active, SA2005RF0092, <http://ag.ca.gov/initiatives/pdf/sa2005rf0092.pdf> (accessed June 17, 2006.) The Legislature is also debating two complementary bills, AB 50, Amended March 10, 2006, <http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm> (accessed June 17, 2006) and SB 1128, Amended May 30, 2006, <http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm> (accessed June 17, 2006.)
- <sup>29</sup> Much more information is available at [www.jessicaslaw2006.com](http://www.jessicaslaw2006.com). A fact sheet, comparing existing law to that proposed in Jessica's Law is available at [http://www.jessicaslaw2006.com/fact\\_sheet.pdf](http://www.jessicaslaw2006.com/fact_sheet.pdf) (accessed June 17, 2006.)